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By HUBERT D. HENRY*
Mr. Henry demonstrates his expertise in the area of adminis-
trative law in Colorado as he urges reform in the State Administra-
tive Procedure Act. After discussing the development of the APA,
the author points out its shortcomings by examples of agencies which
are not governed by the act. The lack of uniformity and multifarious
procedural differences among administrative agencies warrant con-
sideration of the reforms posed by the revised State Administrative
Procedure Act which The Colorado Legislature failed to enact in
1963. He then discusses how the revised act would resolve many of
the problems not covered by the present act. Moreover he recom-
mends that all agency material which is required by law to be pub-
lished be compiled in a state register. Presently, this material may be
published separately by each agency. Mr. Henry urges that the re-
vised act be reconsidered by the legislature as soon as possible to
attain procedural uniformity in administrative agencies.
INTRODUCTION
T HE State Administrative Procedure Act of Colorado (APA) was
born of necessity- or at least expediency verging on necessity.
A uniform and explicit statement of the law regulating procedures
of Colorado's many administrative agencies was sought by the pro-
ponents of the act. At the time of the statute's drafting in 1959,
there was an increasing demand for the creation of new state agencies
and for the revision of acts governing existing agencies.' Propo-
nents of such legislation urged that it include greater detail con-
cerning procedure and review. It was evident, however, that the
inclusion of such details in the acts regulating individual agencies
would undesirably increase the bulk of the statutes. But experience
under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act had shown that
many of these details could be incorporated into a single statute
relating to a large number of agencies; statutes pertaining to indi-
vidual agencies could thereby be shortened, and the desired uni-
formity achieved.
The Administrative Law Committee of the Colorado Bar Asso-
ciation undertook the task of writing such a statute. Its proposed
Member Colorado Bar, Chairman, Colorado Bar Association Administrative Law Com-
mittee, 1957-63.
1 Henry, Bar Briefs The 1959 Session of the Colorado General Assembly, 36 DICTA, 257,
264 (1959).
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bill was presented to the Colorado General Assembly and enacted
into law in 1959.2 It was amended slightly in 19613 at the sugges-
tion of the Administrative Law Committee of the Colorado Bar
Association, and is now Article 16, of Chapter 3, of the Colorado
Revised Statutes of 1963. The act is generally referred to as the
State Administrative Procedure Act, although it is not officially
designated as such by the statute.
The basic guide used by the Colorado Bar Committee in draft-
ing this act was the 1957 final draft of the proposed federal code
of administrative procedure.4 Since its adoption in 1946,' the Fed-
eral Administrative Procedure Act has never been substantially
amended. However, during the years subsequent to the adoption
of the federal act, committees of the American Bar Association have
attempted unsuccessfully to secure a major revision that would in-
corporate clarifications found desirable after actual experience under
that act; the 1957 proposed code was the fruit of one committee's
efforts.
The drafters also referred to the revised Model State Adminis-
trative Procedure Act to assist them in preparing the Colorado
Statute. The Model Act was first adopted by the National Con.
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1946; it was
meant to parallel the federal act, but for state administrative pro-
cedure. The initial draft underwent a subsequent period of revision
which culminated in the revised Model Act of 1961.6
The drafters of the federal act and the model state act began
with the same basic propositions and ideas in mind. Although
development of the acts by separate committees caused some varia-
tion in language and arrangement, their major provisions remained
substantially the same. The Colorado Bar Committee drew from
both acts the provisions that it felt would be desirable in adminis-
trative practice in Colorado, rejecting only those which seemed in-
appropriate to specific attitudes and practices which had developed
through the years in the state's administrative procedure. As a re-
sult, the APA varies in language and to some extent in arrangement
of content from the federal and revised model state act, but does
not vary significantly in substance.
2 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 3-16-1 to -6 (1963).
3 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 44, at 138.
4The American Bar Association Code was introduced as S. 2335, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1964), and the Senate watered it down to S. 1663, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). See
generally 1 DAVIS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.04 (Supp. 1966).
S60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1952).
6 Reprinted and criticised in DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, Cases-Text-PROBLEMS




In spite of the lack of substantial amendment to the Colorado
act since its enactment in 1959, the present law has not been com-
pletely satisfactory. In 1963 the Administrative Law Committee of
the Colorado Bar Association presented to the General Assembly
a complete revision of the law.' However, because of an amendment
to the bill in the House of Representatives which apparently would
have permitted non-lawyers to represent others" before administra-
tive agencies, the Colorado Bar Association withdrew its support of
the bill, and it died in the Senate.9
The APA does not achieve the commendable goal of uniformity
sought by its proponents. One of its greatest inadequacies is the
following provision: "Where a specific statutory provision applies
to a specific agency, such specific statutory provision shall control
as to such agency."1  This clause has left many areas of procedure
where the APA is consequently inapplicable. By discussing the scope
of this law and other statutory provisions applicable to agencies,
major areas of conflict are discernable. At that point recommended
reforms to rectify these conflicts can be discussed.
I. THE PRESENT STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
The present APA in addition to the definitions section" and
the applicability provision,' has the following four main parts:
Rule-making, procedure: Licensing; Hearings; and Judicial review.
A. Rule-making'"
Before making a rule [regulation] an agency must hold a pub-
lic rule-making proceeding.'4 At least twenty days before the hear-
ing, the agency must give public notice, stating the time, place and
nature of the proceeding, the authority under which the rule is pro-
7IH.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (1963). Although there are no official
copies of unenacted bills, the Legislative Reference Office maintains files of copies as
introduced unofficially. (Hereinafter the revised Administrative Procedure Act, as in-
troduced and unenacted will be referred to as H.B. 69. Within the sections of the bill
are the sections of the act, and citations to specific portions of the bill will be by ref-
erence to the statutory section of the appropriate section of the bill).
8 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-4(3) of § 1 at 9: "Shall be entitled
to the benefit of legal counsel of his own choosing" was amended by striking the word
"legal" before "counsel" and adding the words "or other person" after "counsel" and
by adding a poviso that "A person other than a counsel representing a party at a hearing
may question or cross-examine witnesses or present argument." It would seem that the
effect of the proviso would be to prohibit a "counsel" from questioning or cross-exam-
ining witnesses or presenting argument. H. JOURNAL, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st
Sess. at 597 (1963).
9 The bill was not reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee by the end of the ses-
sion and died under state procedure.
10 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-6 (1963).
11 COLO. REv. STAT. § 3-16-1 (1963).
1 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16 (1963).
13 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-2 (1963).
14 COLO. REv. STAT. § 3-16-2 (1963).
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posed, and either the substance of the proposed rule or a description
of the subjects and issues involved.1"
The agency must afford interested persons an opportunity to
submit written data, views, or arguments concerning proposed rules.
Unless the agency deems it unnecessary, such views can be presented
orally at the hearing. In any case, the agency must consider all
submissions."6
A rule becomes effective on the date prescribed in the rule, but
this effective date may not be less than twenty days after publication
of the rule's adoption.
17
A temporary or emergency rule may be adopted without the
holding of a hearing and without notice where the agency finds
that "immediate adoption of the rule is imperatively necessary for
the preservation of public health, safety or welfare, and compliance
with the requirements [for notice and postponement of effective
date] ...would be contrary to the public interest."'"
Any interested person has the right to petition for the issuance,
amendment, or repeal of a rule. These petitions are open to public
inspection. The agency does not have to act on every petition, but
once it has undertaken rule-making on a certain subject, all petitions
relevant to the subject matter must be considered and acted upon.'
An agency is required to maintain a register of (1) its currently
effective rules, (2) the current status of each published proposal for
rules, and (3) minutes of all its actions upon rules.20 Copies of any
rule then in effect or of any notice of a proposed rule-making pro-
ceeding in which action has not been completed must be made
available to the public; the agency must deliver a copy to anyone
requesting it and paying the cost of copying. Unless it has been
published and made available to the public, no rule can be relied
upon or cited by the agency against any person.2'
Each agency is required to maintain a mailing list, which must
include the attorney general and every other person who has re-
quested that he be placed on the list and paid the fee set to cover
the mailing cost. 2 The prescribed method of publication or giving
of any notice, either of a proposed rule-making proceeding, or of
the adoption of a rule, is by mailing a copy to each person on the
15 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-2(3) (1963).
1
6 
COLO. REv. STAT. § 3-16-2(4) (1963).
'7 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-2'(5) (1963).
18
COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-2(6) (1963).
1 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-2(7) (1963).
2COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-2(4) (1963).
21 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-2'(10) (1963).
22 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-2(11) (1963).
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mailing list, and by placing and keeping a copy on permanent file
in the agency's office available for public inspection.
23
Investigation of the practice of a number of specific agencies
indicates a wide variation in the practical application of the above
provisions. The State Department of Public Welfare charges $12
a year for placing a name on its mailing list. Usually, twenty days
before each monthly board meeting, the Department sends a notice
of all matters to be considered at the meeting, and after each meet-
ing, it sends another notice of the actions taken. The Colorado
State Department of Public Health puts names on its mailing list
without charging a fee. However, it has not in all cases followed
the law requiring the giving of notice of adoption of regulations;
some of its regulations therefore may not be in effect.24 The Colo-
rado State Board of Pharmacy charges $2 for placement on its mail-
ing list, within the fee renewable upon request from the board.
Rule-making proceedings before the pharmacy board are infrequent,
and consequently there is no need for frequent mailing of notices.
The author's request to be placed on the mailing list of other
agencies brought these results: from the State Civil Service Com-
mission, notices of all the examinations to be held; from the Colo-
rado State Department of Employment, nothing; from the Depart-
ment of Revenue, notices about the new income tax regulations.
B. Licensing
25
A proceeding for the revocation, suspension, annulment, limi-
tation, or modification of a license is not to be commenced until
the agency has given the licensee notice in writing of facts or con-
duct that may warrant such action and has afforded him an oppor-
tunity to submit written data, views, and arguments with respect
to such facts or conduct. 26 Except in cases of deliberate and willful
violation, the licensee must be given reasonable opportunity to com-
ply with all lawful requirements. Such a proceeding is commenced
by the filing of a written and signed complaint stating the name
of the licensee complained against and the grounds for the requested
action. No previously issued license shall be revoked, suspended,
annulled, or modified until after a hearing.2"
23 In addition, "each state agency which regulates a public activitiy or which requires
forms to be filed by either private or public groups, agencies or businesses . . ." is re-
quired to file copies of all rules, regulations and forms with the Legislative Council
before the convening of the 1967 General Assembly. HousE JOINT REs. 1024, 45th
Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess., para. (2) (F) (1965), recorded in Colo. Sess. Laws 1965,
at 1503, 1506.
24 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-2(10) (1963).
2 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-3'(1963).
2S COL.. REV. STAT. § 3-16-3(4) (1963).
2 CO.O. REV. STAT. § 3-16-3(6) (1963).
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Notwithstanding these requirements, where "the agency has
reasonable grounds to believe and finds that the licensee has been
guilty of deliberate and willful violation, or that the public health,
safety, or welfare imperatively requires emergency action, and in-
corporates such findings in its order .. .,,28 it may summarily sus-
pend the license without notice.
A licensee who seeks renewal of a license, or who seeks a new
license for previously licensed continuing activity, must make timely
and sufficient application to the agency. If he does so, his license
does not expire until his application is finally acted upon. 9 If the
application is denied or the terms of the new license limited, his
license does not expire until judicial review has been sought or the





A person entitled to notice of a hearing must be given timely
notice of the time, place, nature thereof, the legal authority and
jurisdiction under which it is to be held, and the matters of fact and
law asserted.
3 2
The present law provides that the agency shall preside at the
taking of evidence. However, if so provided by law, a member or
members of the body which constitute the agency or a hearing com-
missioner, may preside in lieu of the agency as a body.33 Whoever
the presiding officer is, he must conduct his functions in an im-
partial manner. He may withdraw if he deems himself disquali-
fied. If any party files an affidavit charging that the presiding
officer is personally biased or otherwise disqualified, the presiding
officer must determine the issue as a matter of record in the case.3
The presiding or deciding officer must be independent of super-
vision or direction by any officer, employee, or agent engaged in
the performance of investigatory or prosecuting functions for the
agency.
30
The presiding officer has generally the same authority over
the conduct of the hearing as does a judge in the district court.37
2 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-3(4) (1963).
2 9 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-3(7) (1963).
30 Ibid.
31 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-4 (1963).
32 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-4(2) (1963).
33 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-4(3) (1963).
4 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-4(6) (1963).
37 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-4(4) (1963).
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He may administer oaths and affirmations, issue subpoenas, rule
upon the offers of proof, receive evidence, hear and dispose of mo-
tions, and otherwise regulate the course of the hearing. 8  Subpoenas
must be issued without discrimination at the request of either public
or private parties. 9 Proceedings to enforce a subpoena may be
brought in the district court." The court must sustain the subpoena
if it is found to be in accordance with law and must issue an order
requiring the appearance of witnesses or the production of data
under penalty of punishment for contempt in case of contumacious
failure to comply with the order of the court. 1
The rules of evidence, requirements of proof, and procedures
before the agency are generally the same as those in civil nonjury
cases in the district courts.4 Usually the proponent of an order has
the burden of proof.48 An agency may take notice of general, tech-
nical, or scientific facts within its knowledge, but the fact so noticed
must be specified in the record or brought to the attention of the
parties before final decision, with opportunity in every party to
controvert the fact so noticed.4 4 "Every party and every person
compelled to testify or to submit data or evidence ... shall be entitled
to the benefit of counsel and to retain, or on payment of reasonable





Actions of the agency may be judicially reviewed in two ways:
(1) in a civil or criminal action brought by the agency to enforce
its action; or (2) in a district court action for review filed by an
aggrieved or adversely affected person in accordance with the Colo-
rado Rules of Civil Procedure. Any person affected adversely or
aggrieved by reviewable agency action has standing to seek judicial
review, whether or not he was a party to the agency action.47 The
action for review may be brought against the agency, individuals
comprising the agency, or a person representing the agency or acting
38 Ibid.
39 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-4(5) (1963).
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 COLO. REV. STAT. '§ 3-16-4(4) (1963).
43 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-4(7) (1963).
44 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-4(8) (1963).
4
5 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-4(9) (1963).
46 COLO. RiV. STAT. '§ 3-16-5 ('1963).
47 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-5(3) (1963).
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on its behalf in the matter sought to be reviewed. When an agency
record has been made, review is on its record.41 It is, therefore,
extremely important that a complete and detailed record be made
before the agency. If a record was not made before the agency, or
if the alleged procedural errors or irregularities do not appear in
the agency record, a record for appellate review is made by trial in
the reviewing court.4"
If the reviewing court finds no error, it shall affirm the agency
action. If it finds error, the court must hold unlawful and set aside
the agency action, restrain the enforcement of the order or rule
under review, compel the agency to take any action which it has
unlawfully withheld or unduly delayed, remand the case for further
proceedings, or afford such other relief as may be appropriate. 0
Any of the following may be grounds for setting aside agency ac-
tion: (1) arbitrary or capricious action; (2) denial of statutory right;
(3) action contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or im-
munity; (4) action in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority,
purposes, or limitations; (5) action not in accord with the pro-
cedures or procedural limitation of the administrative procedure
act or otherwise required by law; (6) abuse or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion; (7) action based upon findings of fact that
are clearly erroneous on the whole record; (8) action unsupported
by the evidence; or (9) otherwise contrary to law.51 The decision
of the district court may be reviewed by the Supreme Court upon
writ of error.
52
Upon a finding that irreparable injury would otherwise result,
the agency must postpone the effective date of the agency action
pending judicial review. 3 The reviewing court, whether or not an
application for postponement has been denied by the agency, shall,
upon a finding of irreparable injury, or to preserve the rights of
the parties pending conclusion of the review proceedings, postpone
the effective date of agency action, and may enjoin, upon a showing of
irreparable injury, the conduct of any agency proceeding in which
the proceeding itself or the action proposed to be taken therein is
clearly beyond the constitutional or statutory jurisdiction or authority
of the agency. "4 If the court finds that any proceeding contesting
4 8 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-5(2) (1963).
49 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-5(6) (1963).




COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-5(5) (1963).
54 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-5(8) '(1963).
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the jurisdiction or authority of the agency is frivolous or brought
for the purpose of delay, it shall assess against the plaintiff costs
and a reasonable sum for attorney's fees [or an equivalent sum in
lieu thereof].55
II. EXCEPTIONS To THE APA
Although most of the recently enacted statutes relating to ad-
ministrative agencies have adopted most or all of the provisions of
the APA by reference,5" many provisions remain, particularly in
statutes enacted prior to the APA that do conflict with the APA.
The number of conflicts can and should be held to a minimum by
strictly and narrowly construing the crucial provision that "where
a specific statutory provision applies to a specific agency, such spe-
cific statutory provision shall control as to such agency." 7 Only if
there is an actual conflict between the APA and the statute applying
to any specific agency, does the latter control, and then only to the
extent of the specific conflict.
Nevertheless, many areas of major conflict remain. Even a
shade of difference between provisions in individual statutes and
those in the APA may make an important difference in a particular
situation. Statutes relating to some agencies, particularly the Indus-
trial Commission, create great divergence in agency procedures. It
would be impractical to enumerate here all the conflicting provisions,
but an attempt will be made to set forth the major ones.
A. Problems of Review
The most noticeable differences between specific controlling
statutes and the APA provisions arise in the area of judicial review.
The APA does not specify the county in which judicial review shall
commence. However, individual controlling statutes variously pro-
vide that review shall commence in the City and County of Denver, 8
in the county of residence or place of business of the appellant or
55 Ibid.
5
6E.g., Colo. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 44, § 5(1)'(f) at 203; Colo. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 45, §
7(5)(c) at 219.
5 7 COLO. REv. STAT. § 3-16-6 (1963).
58 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-2-7 (1963) (Board of Examiners of Barbers, unfair practices);
32-2-7 '(1963) (Board of Cosmetology, price regulation) ; 72-1-11 (1963) (Insurance
Department, revocation of certificate of authority) ; 72-5-3 (1963) (Insurance Depart-
ment, mutual insurance) ; 72-9-6 (1963) (Insurance Department, mutual benefit asso-
ciations) ; 72-10-20 (1963) (Insurance Department, sickness and accident insurance) ;
72-14-8(1) (1963) (Insurance Department, unfair competition) ; 72-14-10 (1963)
(Insurance Department, unfair competition-intervenors) ; 73-3-18 '(1963) (Bank
Commissioner, consumer finance-small loans law) ; 125-1-22 (1963) (Commissioner
of Securities, licensing and practice act).
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in which a particular act took place,"9 in any district court in Colo-
rado, 0 or in the federal courts.6 Some statutes provide that the
action in the district court shall be de novo,6 ' and one provides that
the appellant may have a jury trial.6"
Nowhere is the confusion greater than in denominating the
review action. The APA says, "Any other case of review of agency
action shall be commenced by the filing of an action for review in
the district court in accordance with the rules of civil procedure."6 4
Some statutes provide, however, that the review shall be by cer-
tiorari, 65 certiorari or other proper method, 66 certiorari or other-
59 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-1-9(1) (1963) (Abstracters' Board of Examiners, licensing
and regulation) ; 14-17-9(6) (Supp. 1965) (Banking Department, industrial banks) ;
32-1-21 (1963) (Board of Cosmetology, registration) ; 51-1-6(9) (Supp. 1965)
(Board of Registration for Professional Engineers) ; 61-1-25 (1963) (Board of Funeral
Directors and Embalmers) ; 68-2-6 (1963) (restaurant licensing, issuance of license) ;
68-2-9 (1963) (restaurant licensing, revocation of license) ; 69-7-7 (2) ( 1963 ) (Anti-
discrimination Commission, fair housing act) ; 72-1-21 (1963) (Insurance Department,
insurance brokers); 72-9-29 (1963) (Insurance Department, mutual benefit associa-
tions) ; 75-1-7 (1963) (liquor licensing, low alcohol content) ; 75-2-8(2) (1963)
(liquor licensing, high alcohol content) ; 80-4-8(8) (1963) (Industrial Commission,
Labor Peace Act); 80-10-10 '(1963) (Industrial Commission, theatrical employment
agencies) ; 80-21-8 (1963) (Industrial Commission, antidiscrimination) ; 112-8-8
( 1963) (State Engineer, floating logs on streams) ; 116-10-13 (1963) (Public Utilities
Commission, railroad safety appliances) ; 116-13-11 (1963) (Public Utilities Commis-
sion, railroad employees) ; 125-7-14 (1963) (Bank Commissioner, money order act) ;
129-3-3(24) (1963) (Secretary of State, bingo and raffles law) ; 138-5-3(5) (1963)
(Director of Revenue, sales and use tax) ; 138-9-4(2) (Supp. 1965) (Director of Rev-
enue, income ton mile, sales and use tax, cigarette and motor fuel taxes) ; 145-1-2(5)
(c) (1963) (Board of Veterinary Medicine) ; 148-5-12 (Supp. 1965) (State Engi-
neer, reservoir storage rights) ; 148-11-17'(1963) (State Engineer, water flow and di-
versions for irrigation) ; 148-18-14 (Supp. 1965) (State Engineer, ground water man-
agement act).
60 COLO. REv. STAT. § 125-2-4 (1963) (Commissioner of Securities, investment con-
tracts).
61 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 100-6-11 (1963) (Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, con-
servation act: "if it [the district court] otherwise has jurisdiction .. ") ; 125-2-4
(1963) (Commissioner of Securities, investment contracts: "in proper case, to the fed-
eral courts."). See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-61 (1948) (jurisdiction of the district
courts) ; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1948). The jurisdiction
stated in the Colorado Revised Statutes sections mentioned above is in addition to con-
current jurisdiction in the state courts.
62 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-1-9 (1963) (Abstracters' Board of Examiners, licensing and
regulation) ; 13-16-3 (1963) (Bank Commissioner, licensing of retail instalment sales
of motor vehicles companies) ; 61-1-25 (1963) (Board of Funeral Directors and Em-
balmers) ; 72-1-11 ( 1963) (Insurance Department, revocation of certificate of authority
of insurance companies) ; 72-1-21(4) (1963) (Insurance Department, insurance brok-
ers) ; 100-6-13 (1963) (Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, conservation act);
125-2-4 (1963) (Cormmissioner of Securities, investment contracts); 138-9-4(2) (b)
(Supp. 1965) (Director of Revenue, income, ton mile, motor fuel, cigarette, sales and
use taxes) ; 148-18-14(4) (Supp. 1965) (State Engineer, ground water management
act).
63 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 72-1-21(4) (1963) (Insurance Department, insurance brokers).
64 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-5(4) (1963).
65 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 62-6-15(3) (1963) (Game and Fish Commission, fur-bearing
animals, fur dealers licenses) ; 91-5-10 (1963) (Board of Examiners in the Basic Sci-
ences, licensing to practice the "healing art").




wise," appeal or writ of certiorari,6 8 writ of certiorari or review, 69
certiorari as is provided in the APA,70 and mandamus or otherwise.'
Moreover, the Colorado Supreme Court has said that there is a statu-
tory review provided for by the APA which is not necessarily a
review under Rule 106 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.72 These
differences in language and interpretation may suggest the possi-
bility of conflicts even though the ramifications of such possibility
remain unclear.
Prescribed procedures for initiating review are varied. The
statute concerning liquidation of banks provides that "Notice of
review in the district court shall be filed with said bank commis-
sioner within thirty days after his decision is announced, whereupon
the state bank commissioner shall report the facts to the court with
a petition that said court pass upon the validity of the claim. 73
A taxpayer may take an appeal from action of the Director of Reve-
nue by filing with the clerk of the court a copy of the notice of final
determination received by the taxpayer together with a written
notice stating that the taxpayer appeals to the district court and
alleging the pertinent facts upon which such appeal is grounded.74
Appeals from the Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers are
made by filing notice in writing of such appeal with the clerk of
the district court and mailing a copy of such notice of appeal to the
secretary of the board.75
Under the Rules of Civil Procedure an agency would have
twenty days to file its answer. Statutes applicable to the Board of
Examiners of Barbers and to the Commissioner of Securities require
the agency to file its answer in ten days.
7 6
Although the APA does not require the furnishing of security
on judicial review, some statutes require the appellant to put up a
bond, usually for costs.77 A public utility appealing a decision of
67 COLO. REV. STAT. § 75-2-8(2) (1963) (liquor licensing, high alcohol content).
68 COLO. REV. STAT. § 72-14-7(2) (1963) (Insurance Department, unfair competition).
69 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 115-6-15(1) to -16(1) (1963) (Public Utilities Commission,
conduct of hearings and investigations).
70 COLO. RaV. STAT. § 138-3-12 (Supp. 1965) (Director of Revenue, cigarette tax).
71 COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 68-2-6 (1963) (Department of Health, issuance of restaurant
license) ; 68-2-9 (1963) (Department of Health, revocation of restaurant license).
72 Theobald v. District Court, 148 Colo. 466, 366 P.2d 563 (1961).
73 COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-14-11 (1963) (Banking Department, liquidation of banks).
74 COLO. REV. STAT. § 138-9-4(3) (Supp. 1965) (Director of Revenue, ton mile, motor
fuel, cigarette, income, sales and uses taxes).
75 COLO. REV. STAT. § 61-1-25 (2) (1963) (Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers).
76 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-2-7 (2) (1963) (Board of Examiners of Barbers, unfair prac-
tices); 125-2-4(1) (1963) (Commissioner of Securities).
77 COLO REV. STAT. §§ 1-1-9(1) (1963) (Abstracters' Board of Examiners, licensing
and regulation); 13-11-17 (1963) (Motor Vehicle Dealers' Administrator and Ad-
visory Board, dealers' licenses); 112-8-8 (1963) (State Engineer, floating logs on




the state tax commission must pay the full amount of all taxes levied
upon the valuation for assessment of its property and plant prior
to taking its appeal."' One very obnoxious and unfair provision of
doubtful constitutionality is the provision that before taking an
appeal a taxpayer must file with the district court a bond in twice
the amount of the taxes, interest, and other charges stated in the
final determination by the director of revenue or at his option de-
posit the stated amount of taxes with the director of revenue in
lieu of posting bond." The fact that in one district court case80
the state did not raise the issue of the failure of the taxpayer to comply
with either of these provisions may indicate that the agency also
doubts the validity of the provisions.
Another statute provides that no suit shall be maintained in
any court to restrain or prevent the collection of the motor fuel tax,
but an aggrieved distributor shall pay the tax, penalty, and interest
under protest and may institute suit within ninety days to recover
such taxes and penalty."
Under the APA, the filing of an action for review does not
automatically stay the decision of the agency. However, the APA
does provides that the agency or the court may postpone the effec-
tive date of agency action, upon a finding that irreparable injury
would otherwise result, or to preserve the rights of the parties pend-
ing conclusion of the review proceedings.8 2 Some statutes provide
that the filing of an action for judicial review shall automatically
78 CoLO. REV. STAT. § 137-4-9(2) (Supp. 1965) (State Board of Equalization, ad va-
lorem general property tax). The provision has doubtful constitutionality.
79 CoLO. REV. STAT. § 138-9-4(4) (Supp. 1965) (Director of Revenue, income, ton mile,
passenger mile, motor fuel, cigarette, sales and use taxes). The constitutional objection
is that a person should not be required to file an appeal bond in a penal sum, particularly
in a sum double the taxes, interest "and other charges" when the taxpayer has never been
in court about the validity of the sum alleged. If the taxpayer has already been in court,
and is taking an appeal to a higher court from a lower court, there is a distinguishable
fact, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-6-11 (1963) (Repealed, Colo. Sess. Laws 1964, ch.
45, § 73, at 436, replaced by § 54, at 428) provided that appeals from county court
were conditioned on bond double the amount of a money judgment. See also COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 139-36-8 to -10 (1963), for appeals from a municipal court. In Mardi,
Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 151 Colo. 28, 375 P.2d 682, noted in 40 DEN.
L.C.J. 149 (1962), the supreme court considered the provision of the ad valorem tax
law that required payment of taxes before taking appeal, CoLo. REV. STAT. § 137-3-38
(1963). The court did not address itself to the question of whether the bond or pay-
ment of taxes was invalid in all instances but held that it was invalid as it applied to
Mardi. The taxes normally do not have to be paid until March, and therefore, the fact
that a taxpayer appeals before March does not accelerate his duty to pay taxes before
filing the appeal. The basic question, whether any taxpayer must pay remains unan-
swered. However, referring to other cases, the court said that appeals from administra-
tive determinations should be subject to liberal rules of statutory construction, "when,
as here, the appealing parties have acted in good faith and with reasonable promptness."
151 Colo. at 34, 375 P.2d at 685.
80 Henry v. Theobald, Civil No. B-39283, D. Colo., 1957. Compare Liebhardt v, Depart-
ment of Revenue, 123 Colo. 369, 229 P.2d 655 (1951), on tax questions involved
in a prior estate.
81 COLO. REV. STAT. § 138-2-16 (1963) (Director of Revenue, motor fuel tax).
82 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-5(5) (1963).
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postpone the effective date of the agency action.8" Other statutes
provide that the effective date of the agency action shall not be
stayed except upon notice to the agency and the furnishing of a
bond, 4 or without the furnishing of a bond,85 or without notice
and hearing. 6 Two statutes provide that the determination of the
agency is final until final determination of the court review.87
Grounds for setting aside agency action are as varied in spe-
cific agency statutes as the hues of the rainbow. However, many of
such statutes, even though at some variance with the APA are not
sufficiently different from the APA to justify separate or detailed
consideration. Briefly enumerated, particular statutory grounds in-
clude a finding or determination that: the agency abused its discre-
tion or exceeded its jurisdiction; 88 the action was unlawful or un-
reasonable, 9 was without good cause,90 was arbitrary and without
good cause,9 was arbitrary and without just cause,92 or arbitrary,9
was unreasonable, unjust, arbitrary or capricious or violated any
constitutional right of the party; 94 the agency acted without or in
excess of its power; the finding, order or award was procured by
fraud; that the award does not do substantial justice to the parties ;95
or that the agency was guilty of gross negligence or an abuse of
83 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-1-9 (1963) (Abstracters' Board of Examiners, licensing and
regulation); 7-4-10 (1963) (Department of Agriculture, commission and brokerage
marketing) ; 7-12-8(2) (1963) (Department of Agriculture, frozen food provisioner's
law) ; 61-1-25 (2) (1963) (Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers) ; 72-10-20
(1963) (Insurance Department, sickness and accident insurance) ; 80-4-8(10) (1963)
(Industrial Commission, labor peace act) ; 80-21-8(10) (1963) (Industrial Commis-
sion, antidiscrimination) ; 112-8-9 (1963) (State Engineer, floating logs on streams).
84 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-2-7(3) (1963) (Board of Examiners of Barbers, unfair prac-
tices) ; 32-2-7(4) (1963) (Board of Cosmetology, price regulation) ; 129-3-3(24)
(d) (1963) (Secretary of State, bingo and raffles).
85 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 72-1-11(3) (1963) (Insurance Department, revocation of certifi-
cate of authority of insurance companies) ; 100-6-12 (1963) (Oil and Gas Conservation
Commission, conservation act); 115-6-16(3) (1963) (Public Utilities Commission,
hearings and investigations).
86 CoLo. REV. STAT. § 80-1-38 (1963) (Industrial Commission, powers and duties).
87 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-11-17 (1963) (Motor Vehicle Dealers' Administrator and
Advisory Board) ; 148-5-12 (Supp. 1965) (State Engineer, reservoir storage rights).
88COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-17-2(6) (Supp. 1965) (Banking Department, industrial
banks).
89 COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-2-7(2) (1963) (Board of Examiners of Barbers, unfair prac-
tices).
90 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 68-2-6 (1963) (Department of Health, issuance of restaurant
license) ; 68-2-9 '(1963) (Department of Health, revocation of restaurant license).
91 COLO. REV. STAT. § 75-1-7(6) (1963) (liquor licensing authorities, fermented malt
beverage, low alcohol content).
92 COLO. REv. STAT. § 138-1-84 (Supp. 1965) (Director of Revenue, income tax).
93 CoLo. REV. STAT. § 75-2-8(2) (1963) (liquor licensing authorities, hard liquor).
9 CoLo. REV. STAT. § 100-6-13 (1963) (Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, con-
servation act).
9 CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 80-1-40(1)(e) (1963) (Industrial Commission, powers and
duties) ; 81-14-12 (1963) (Industrial Commission, workmen's compensation proce-
dure).
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discretion." In the case of one agency specific grounds for setting
aside its action on review are not enumerated, but rather the "court
shall make such decree . . . as to the court may seem just and
proper."'
9 7
B. Problems with rule-making
The APA varies greatly from particular statutory provisions
concerning rule-making. Some statutes provide for a different time
of notice of rule-making than that prescribed by the APA9" and
others for a different lapse of time between adoption and effective
date.")9 The statute controlling the Oil and Gas Conservation Com-
mission provides that a temporary rule shall not be effective for
more than fifteen days. 100
In some instances, notice of rule-making proceedings or of the
adoption of a rule, or both, is to be given by newspaper publica-
tion.' One statute permits newspaper publication of a notice of
rule-making proceeding in lieu of personal service.'0 2 Some agencies
are required to give notice of the adoption of rules by posting on
96 COLO. REV. STAT. § 128-1-10 (1963) (Board of Appeals of Soil Conservation Board,
soil conservation districts).
97 COLO. REv. STAT. § 51-2-10(7) (1963) (Board of Registration for Professional Engi-
neers, surveyors ).
98 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-13-12 (1963) (Department of Agriculture, commercial ferti-
lizers, 10 days); 66-15-5(3) (b) (1963) (Department of Public Health, enriched
flour and bread, 10 days); 66-21-5(1) (a) (1963) '(Department of Public Health,
hazardous household substances labeling act, 30 days) ; 100-6-7(2) (1963) (Oil and
Gas Conservation Commission, conservation act, 10 days).
99 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-3-12 (1963) (Department of Agriculture, marketing orders,
5 days) ; 62-2-13(1) (1963) (Game, Fish and Parks Commission, 2 days) ; 66-15-5
(3) (b) (1963) (Department of Public Health, enrichment of flour and bread act, 30
days) ; 66-20-19(3) (1963) (Department of Public Health, pure food and drug law,
60 days unless in case of emergency) ; 66-21-5 (1) (a) (1963) (Department of Public
Health, hazardous household substances labeling act, 60 days) ; 73-3-11 (1) (1963)
(Bank Commissioner, consumer finance law-small loans, 30 days) ; 80-1-9(7) (1963)
(Industrial Commission, rules and regulations, 10 days) ; 80-1-10(1) (1963) (Indus-
trial Commission, orders, 10 days) ; 80-4-3(4) (Supp. 1965) (Industrial Commission,
labor peace act, 10 days) ; 80-7-10(2) (1963) (Industrial Commission, minimum wage
for women and children, Wage Board, 30 days) ; 81-7-8 (1963) (Industrial Commis-
sion, workmen's compensation, 10 days) ; 82-3-2 (1963) (Department of Employment,
employment security, 10 days).
100 COLO. REV. STAT. § 100-6-7 (15) (1963) (Oil and Gas Conservation Commission).
101 CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 7-3-12 (1963) (Department of Agriculture, marketing act of
1939, adoption); 7-5-6 (1963) (Department of Agriculture, fruits and vegetables,
adoption) ; 7-5-7 (1963) (Department of Agriculture, fruits and vegetables, adop-
tion); 62-2-13 (1963) (Game, Fish and Parks Commission, adoption); 66-15-5(5)
(1963) (Department of Public Health, enrichment of flour and bread act, both) ; 66-
21-5(1) (a) (1963) (Department of Public Health, hazardous household substances
labeling act, both) ; 80-7-10(1) (1963) (Industrial Commission, Wage Board, mini-
mum wage for women and children, adoption) ; 82-3-2 (1963) (Department of Em-
ployment, employment security, adoption).
102 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 148-18-11 (Supp. 1965) (State Engineer, Ground Water Com-
mission, ground water management act) ; 148-18-30 (Supp. 1965) (State Engineer,
Ground Water Commission, board of directors of ground water management district,
ground water management act). One statute allows newspaper publication as an alter-




a bulletin board in the office of the agency ;103 other agencies must
file adopted rules with the secretary of state."' Some statutes pro-
vide that notice of rule-making proceedings or notice of the adop-
tion of rules, or both, shall be sent to all licensees or all persons
known to be interested, or all persons of a particular class.' "' Finally,
one statute specifically provides that the provisions of the APA
are not applicable to rule-making proceedings. °6
C. Problems in licensing
The APA requires a complaint for the suspension or revocation
of a license to be in writing and signed by the complainant. The
more strict requirement of several statutes is that such a complaint
be either under oath or verified." 7 The statute pertaining to the
Industrial Commission provides that a complaint of violation of the
law regarding wage equality between the sexes must be verified.'0 8
Some statutes provide that a license shall be suspended or re-
voked by operation of law,' °9 and one of these provides that the
certificate shall be revoked by operation of law without hearing.10
Certainly these phrases cannot be taken literally, because the li-
censee would be entitled to a hearing at least on the question of
whether or not "operation of law" has set in.
The APA provides for the emergency suspension of a license
without notice and without a hearing, where "the agency has rea-
103 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-2-5(1) (1963) (Board of Examiners of Barbers, unfair prac-
tices) ; 32-2-5(1) (1963) (Board of Cosmetology, price regulation); 80-1-9(7)
(1963) (Industrial Commission) ; 81-15-26 (1963) (Industrial Commission, work-
men's compensation insurance rates).
'0CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 10-1-4(4) (1963) (Board of Examiners of Architects) ; 82-3-2
(1963) (Department of Employment, employment security).
10
5 
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 2-1-20 (1963) (Board of Accountancy) ; 7-3-5(3) (1963) (De-
partment of Agriculture, marketing act of 1939) ; 7-5-7 (1963) (Department of Agri-
culture, fruits and vegetables act, interested persons) ; 73-3-11 (1963) (Bank Com-
missioner, consumer finance-small loan law) ; 80-7-10(2) (1963) (Industrial Com-
mission, Wage Board, minimum wage for women and children); 81-7-8 (1963) (In-
dustrial Commission, workmen's compensation) ; 148-18-30 (Supp. 1965) (State En-
gineer, board of directors of ground water management district).
106 "The provisions of article 16 of chapter 3, C.R.S. 1963, shall not be applicable, except
that 3-16-5, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963 shall apply" Colo. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 7, §




COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-3-8(2) (Supp. 1965) (Bank Commissioner, debt adjust-
ment) ; 51-1-6(6) (Supp. 1965) (Board of Registration for Professional Engineers)
51-2-10(2) (1963) (Board of Registration for Professional Engineers, surveyors)
97-1-22 ( 1) (1963) (Board of Nursing, professional nursing practice act).
108 COLO. REv. STAT. § 80-3-3 (1963) (Industrial Commission, wage equality between
sexes act).
109COLO. REV. STAT. § 123-17-21(3) (1963) (Department of Education, teachers' certi-
ficates, suspended without a hearing) ; Colo. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 39, §§ 4(9), at 183
(agent's permit) ; 5(6) (a) at 185 (proprietary school certificate) ; 10(2) at 189
(revocation of permits and certificates). (Proprietary School Act of 1966 to be codi-
fied to COLO. REV. STAT. § 146-3-1).




sonable grounds to believe and finds that the licensee has been
guilty of deliberate and willful violation, or that the public health,
safety, or welfare imperatively requires emergency action .. -111
A number of statutes place a limitation of time on the period during
which such emergency suspension shall be in effect. 112 One statute
provides for 3 days' written notice and a hearing before even making
an emergency suspension.'
i
D. Other problem areas
The APA is very explicit that ex parte testimony cannot be
taken. However, one statute provides that the agency with or without
notice to either party, "may cause testimony to be taken .... All
ex parte testimony taken by the commission shall be reduced to
writing and either party shall have opportunity to examine and
rebut the same on final hearing."11 4
Under the APA the "rules of evidence and requirements of
proof shall conform, to the extent practicable, with those in civil
nonjury cases in the district courts." ' 5 However, several statutes
provide that the specific agency is not bound by technical rules of
evidence or strict rules of procedure." 6
There is some confusion in the statutes concerning the enforce-
ment of an agency subpoena. The APA recognizes the ordinary
method of proceeding -application to the court for a court order
requiring obedience to the subpoena, with punishment by the court
for contempt of its order in case there is refusal to comply." 7 Some
statutes make it a misdemeanor to willfully ignore an agency sub-
1' COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-3(4) (1963).
112 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-14-4(6) (1963) (Department of Agriculture, application of
agricultural chemicals, 10 days) ; 14-19-12(1) (1963) (Banking Department, funeral
contract trust funds, 30 days) ; 62-6-16(4) (1963) (Game, Fish and Parks Commis-
sion, fur dealers, 6 months) ; 68-2-9 (1963) (Department of Health, hotel or restaurant
license, 6 months) ; 75-2-11(2) (1963) (liquor licensing authorities, summary sus-
pension for 15 days, suspension for 6 months) ; 100-6-7(3) (1963) (Oil and Gas
Conservation Commission, 15 days) ; 129-3-3(2) '(1963) Secretary of State, bingo and
raffles law, 30 days) ; 129-3-3 (7) (1963) (Secretary of State, bingo and raffles law,
may stop game pending a hearing not later than 10 days).
113CoLo. REV. STAT. § 14-19-12(1) (1963) (Banking Department, funeral contract
trust funds).
14COLO. REV. STAT. § 80-1-35(3) (1963) (Industrial Commission). Compare COLO.
REV. STAT. § 81-14-3(3) (1963) (Industrial Commission, workmen's compensation).
11
5 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-4(7) (1963).
116 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 2-1-21(6) (1963) (Board of Accountancy) ; 10-1-21(2) (1963)
(Board of Examiners of Architects) ; 23-1-16(2) (1963) (Board of Chiropractic Ex-
aminers) ; 69-7-6(11) (1963) (Antidiscrimination Commission, fair housing) ; 72-
14-6(3) (1963) (Insurance Department, unfair competition) ; 80-1-22 (1963) (In-
dustrial Commission) ; 80-1-28'(1963) (Industrial Commission) ; 80-7-7 (1963) (In-
dustrial Commission, Wage Board, minimum wage of women and children) ; 80-21-7
(11) (1963) (Industrial Commission, antidiscrimination) ; 82-5-7(1) (1963) (De-
partment of Employment, employment security-unemployment compensation); 91-
6-16(2) (1963) (Board of Physical Therapy) ; 97-1-22(2) (1963) (Board of Nurs-
ing) ; 115-6-1 (1963) (Public Utilities Commission).
117 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-4(5) (1963).
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poena 1 8 - a provision of doubtful constitutionality. Perhaps the
most illustrative example of this confusion is the procedure for en-
forcement provided by the legislature if a taxpayer fails or refuses
to respond to a subpoena. In such a case the judge, upon applica-
tion, "may cause arrest of such person, and upon hearing, said judge
shall have, for the purpose of enforcing obedience to the require-
ments of said subpoena, power to make such order as, in his dis-
cretion, he deems consistent with the law for punishment of con-
tempts." 119 This provision was adopted in 1965 despite court de-
cisions indicating that such procedure is undoubtedly unconstitutional
and could not be upheld by a court. The bill drafters and legislators
who should have been enlightened by and benefited from such de-
cisions nevertheless ignored them in approving this clause.
III. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
The best method to overcome the major shortcomings of the
APA would be the adoption of the revised State Administrative
Procedure Act (hereinafter revised act) presented by the Adminis-
trative Law Committee of the Colorado Bar Association to the
Colorado General Assembly in 1963.12° The 1963 bill would have
done away with many of the conflicts between the APA and other
statutes by specifically repeating sections in those statutes which
deviated from the APA.' 2' The proposed revisions to the APA it-
self included a number of changes of considerable materiality,
along with improvements in language which clarified, but did not
substantially change, the meaning of certain provisions. 122 The
changes of greatest materiality will be discussed here.
The revised act offically designates the act as the "State Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act,' '123 the name it has had unofficially from
the beginning.
A. Hearing officers
The greatest single change is the provision for the appointment
of hearing officers and the conducting of hearings by such offi-
cers. 124 The bill provides that "at a hearing only one of the follow-
118 COLo. Ray. STAT. §§ 80-8-13 (1963) (Industrial Commission, wage law) ; 81-14-21
(1963) (Industrial Commission, workmen's compensation) ; 82-3-8 (2) (1963) (De-
partment of Employment, employment security) ; 117-1-15 (1963) (Real Estate Brok-
ers Board).
119 COLO. REV. STAT. § 138-9-11 (2) (Supp. 1965) (Director of Revenue).
120 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (1963).
121 Ibid.
1221 Ibid.
123 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-7 of § 1, at 21 (1963).
124 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-4 of § 1, at 8-17 (1963).
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ing may preside: The agency; a hearing officer appointed in accord-
ance with subsection [9] of this section, or if otherwise authorized
by law a hearing officer, who, if authorized by law may be a mem-
ber of the body which comprises the agency."
12 5
Although a number of agencies have their own hearing offi-
cers, 12 it was necessary the revised act provide for a panel of
hearing officers for those agencies that do not have their own. Under
the above provision an agency could conduct a hearing through its
own hearing officer, or through a hearing officer selected from the
panel.
Subsection [9]127 provides that in order to maintain an ade-
quate panel of qualified hearing officers, the governor shall ap-
point a sufficient number of hearing officers, each of whom shall
continue as a member of the panel for a period of six years unless
removed for cause by the governor. All hearing officers must be
attorneys at law duly admitted to practice before the Supreme
Court of Colorado, must have been practicing attorneys in Colorado
for at least three years, and must be familiar with the conduct of
administrative proceedings. The officers on the panel would not
all be members of the same political party. They would not be under
civil service. A member of the panel would be designated as chief
hearing officer and would receive a salary of $100 a month in
addition to other compensation provided for. When an agency
wished to delegate the holding of a hearing to an officer appointed
in accordance with this sub-section, it would so advise the chief
hearing officer, who would then select an officer to hold the hear-
ing. Hearings would be apportioned, so far as practicable, equally
among the respective hearing officers. Notwithstanding this, the
chief hearing officer would consider the potential hearing officer's
knowledge of the field of law involved, his place of residence, the
place where the hearing would be held, and all other factors. The
hearing officer would receive from the agency $50 for each one-
half day, or $100 for each full day engaged in the conduct of hear-
ings or matters directly connected therewith; and if the hearing
were held outside the place of residence of the hearing officer, he
would receive mileage at the statutory rate and necessary subsistence
expenses. The bill provides that the hearing officer may employ a
court reporter, who shall be paid by the agency, to attend the hear-
in, and record the proceedings or he may cause the proceedings to
12 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-4 of subsection 8, at 11. Compare
CoLo. REv. STAT. § 3-16-4 (1963).
126 E.g., State Water Pollution Control Commission, Colo. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 44, §
5(1) (h) at 203; Air Pollution Variance Board, Colo. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 45, §
7(5) (c) at 219.
127 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-4(9) of § 1, at 12 (1963).
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be recorded by electronic recording device. When required, the
hearing officer shall cause the proceedings to be transcribed, the
cost to be paid by the agency or the party ordering the transcription.
If the agency acquires a copy of the transcription, its copy must be
made available to any party at reasonable times for inspection and
study.
The record made by the hearing officer or agency conducting
a hearing includes all pleadings, applications, evidence, exhibits,
other papers presented or considered, matters officially noticed,
rulings upon exceptions, any findings of fact and conclusions of
law proposed by any party, and any written brief filed.' Oral
argument may be permitted.129 No ex parte material or representa-
tion of any kind may be received or considered. The agency or
hearing officer with the consent of all parties may eliminate or
summarize any part of the record where this may be done without
affecting the decision.'30
When a hearing officer has conducted the hearing, he must
prepare and file an initial decision which the agency shall serve
upon each party, unless all parties with the consent of the agency
have expressly waived their right to have an initial decision rendered
by such hearing officer.' Each initial decision must include a
statement of findings and conclusions upon all the material issues
of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record, and the appro-
priate rule, order, sanction, relief, or denial thereof.112 In the ab-
sence of an appeal to the agency or a review upon motion of the
agency itself within thirty days after service of the initial decision,
the initial decision of the hearing officer shall become the decision
of the agency.
33
For the the purpose of review by the agency of the initial de-
cision of the hearing officer, either upon appeal or upon the agency's
own motion, the record includes - in addition to the findings,
conclusions and rulings stated in the initial decision - any excep-
tions and briefs filed. The agency may permit oral argument on
review, but no other material may be considered. 34 The findings
of evidentiary fact as distinguished from ultimate conclusions of
fact made by the hearing officer in his initial decision shall not be
set aside by the agency, unless such findings of evidentiary fact are
128 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-4(14) (1963).
129 Ibid.
130 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assern., 1st Sess. § 3-16-4(13) of § 1, at 15 (1963).
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
133 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assen., 1st Sess. § 3-16-4(13) of § 1, at 16 (1963).
134 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assemn., 1st Sess. § 3-16-4(14) (1963).
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contrary to the weight of the evidence."8 5 The agency may remand
the case to the hearing officer for further proceedings; or it may
affirm, set aside, or modify his order so that the sanction or relief
entered therein will conform with the facts and the law. s6
The initial decision of the hearing officer, or if the agency
conducts the hearing, its decions, shall be served on each party by
personal service or first class mail and shall be effective as to such




Relief from the strict rules of evidence is provided by the addi-
tion in the revised act of the following provision: "However, when
necessary to do so in order to ascertain facts affecting the substantial
rights of the parties to the proceeding, the person so conducting
the hearing may receive and consider evidence not admissible under
such rules, provided it possesses probative value commonly accepted
by reasonable and prudent men in the conduct of their affairs." 131
The revised act also provides that documentary evidence may be
received in the form of a copy or excerpt if the original is not readily
available, provided that upon request the opposing party shall be
given an opportunity to compare the copy with the original. Also,
an agency may utilize its experience, technical competence, and




The revised act restates more dearly the proposition in the
present act that two methods of judicial review of agency action
are available to an adversely affected or aggrieved party. He may
defend a court action brought by the agency to seek enforcement,
or he may commence a separate action against the agency in the
district court in accordance with the rules of civil procedure. 40
Two important qualifications are added by the revised act, how-
ever. Firstly, contrary to the APA, which does not limit the time
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
137 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-4(15) of § 1, at 17 (1963).
138 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-4(11) of § 1, at 15 (1963). See
note 116 Supra and accompanying text.
13Ibid. Compare CoLo. REV. STAT. § 3-16-4(8) (1963).
140 Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-5 (1963), with H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem.,
1st Sess. § 3-16-5 of §1, at 17-18, and with Revised Model State Administrative Pro-




within which review may be sought, the revised act provides that
the independent action for review must be brought within sixty
days after the agency action becomes effective.14' And secondly,
while under the present act any person may commence an action
for judicial review, under the revised act only a party to the agency
action has standing to commence such an action for judicial re-
view. "'42
Judicial review is also affected by the following changes in
the revised act. A court may require a party who seeks an order
of court postponing agency action to comply with terms and to
provide security before the court enters such an order. Parties to
a review action may reduce the record by stipulation. The revised
act provides that, before seeking review of a district court action
in the Supreme Court, a party must file with the district court a
notice of intent to seek such review. 43 If no notice of intent to
seek Supreme Court review is filed with the trial court within such
thirty days, the trial court shall immediately return the agency's
record to it. When the Supreme Court disposes of a case, it returns
the agency record to the trial court if further proceedings are re-
quired in the trial court; if no further proceedings are necessary,
it either returns the record directly to the agency or the trial court,
which must then forward the record to the agency. Both the district
court and the Supreme Court shall advance on the docket any case
which in the discretion of the court requires acceleration.' 44
D. Additional Improvements
The word "rule" is used throughout the present APA, and the
word "regulation" is ignored. The revised act provides that the
"words 'rule' and 'regulation' are synonymous and may be used in-
terchangeably."'145
The present law requires the rule to state the effective date in
the rule, which shall not be earlier than twenty days after adoption.
The revised act provides that a rule goes into effect twenty days
after publication unless a later effective date is stated in the rule.
14 6
The revised act eliminates the provision that the agency must
issue a concise statement of the matters considered in adopting or
1
4 1 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-5(4) (1963).
1 42 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-5(3) (1963).
143 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assern., 1st Sess. § 3-16-5 (9) (1963).
14 4 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., lst Sess. § 3-16-5'(10) (1963).
145 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-1(1) (d) of § 1, at 1-2. Compare
COLo. REV. STAT. § 3-16-1(1) (d) (1963), with Model Act § 1(7).
146 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-2(4) of § 1, at 4 (1963). Compare
COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-2(5) '(1963), with Model Act § 4(b).
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rejecting a rule and the reasons therefore.' 47 This provision has not
been effectively followed to date. 1
48
The revised act eliminates the provision that "no revocation,
suspension, annulment, limitation or modification by any agency
of a license shall be lawful unless, before institution of agency
proceedings therefor, the agency shall have given the licensee notice
in writing of facts or conduct that may warrant such action, afforded
the licensee opportunity to submit written data, views, and argu-
ments with respect to such facts or conduct, and except in cases
of deliberate and willful violation, given the licensee a reasonable
opportunity to comply with all lawful requirements."' 49 Under the
revised act, an agency must act promptly on an application for li-
cense and immediately after the taking of action give written notice
of the action to the applicant.'5 °
An agency upon its own motion may commence proceedings
for the revocation, suspension, annulment, limitation or modifica-
tion of a previously issued license, but if a complaint is filed by
someone else, the complaint must be signed and sworn to.15'
The revised act does not affect statutory powers of an agency
to issue an emergency order where the agency finds and states of
record that immediate issuance of the order is imperatively necessary
for the preservation of public health, safety, or welfare and ob-
servance of the requirements of notice of hearing would be con-
trary to the public interest. Any person against whom an emergency
order is issued is entitled upon request to an immediate hearing.'52
The revised act provides that witnesses at agency hearings are
entitled to the same fees and mileage provided for witnesses in a
court of record.1s
Each agency must proceed with reasonable dispatch to con-
clude any matter presented to it, giving prompt notice of refusal
to accept for filing or denial in whole or in part of any written
application or other request. Upon a showing to a court that there
has been undue delay in connection with any such proceeding or
147 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-2 (4) of § 1 at 4 (1963). Compare
Model Act § 3 (a) (2), which also requires a concise statement of reasons.
148 See p. 19 supra.
149 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-3(3) (1963) ; Compare, H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem.,
1st Sess. § 3-16-3 of § 1, at 6-8 (1963) ; Model Act § 14(c).
1
50 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-3(3) of § 1, at 6-7 (1963). Com-
pare note 147 supra.
151 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-3(8) of § 1, at 8 (1963). Compare
COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-16-3(5) (1963).
152 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-3(7) of § 1, at 7. Compare CoLo.
REV. STAT. § 3-16-3(4) (1963) ; Model Act § 14(c).
153 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-4(4) of §1, at 10 (1963).
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action, the court may direct the agency to decide the matter
promptly.,
5 4
Every agency must provide by rule for the discretionary enter-
taining and prompt disposition of petitions for declaratory orders
terminating controversies or removing uncertainties. Orders dispos-
ing of such petitions shall constitute agency action subject to judicial
review.' 55
One very desirable addition to the revised act which was not
incorporated in the version presented to the General Assembly in
1963 is a provision for the establishment of a Colorado Regulations
Register.' 56 Everything required by the APA to be published should
be published in a register to be issued by the secretary of state or
other state officer. All persons should be entitled to be on a mailing
list to receive all or part of the publications made in the register.
The officer making publication should determine the fee to be
charged for making mailings, and copies of the register should be
readily available at stated places, for example in the Supreme
Court Library and the office of the clerk of each district court.
There should also be a provision requiring each agency to deliver
to a designated officer a copy of each regulation of the agency
in effect on a given date and requiring the agency to publish all
such regulations in the regulations register.
CONCLUSION
The Colorado Administrative Procedure Act arose out of need or
expediency demanding coordination and an explicit statement of
the statutory provisions regulating procedures of the state's many
administrative agencies. Hopefully such action would achieve uni-
form procedures for all agencies within the state. Although the
APA has performed a major function in regulating those pro-
cedures since its enactment, it does not achieve the uniformity of
procedure which is highly desirable for our rapidly growing struc-
ture of agencies.
Procedures of individual agencies are still too much governed
by specific statutes applicable only to specific agencies. Confusion
is particularly apparent in the area of judicial review, where the
statutes state myriad provisions for initiating appeal and grounds
154 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-4(6) of § 1, at 11 (1963).
15 5 H.B. 69, 44th Colo. Gen. Assem., ist Sess. § 3-16-4(7) of § 1, at 11 (1963).
156 An amendment which would have provided for such a register was drafted. Memoran-
dum to Senator Paul Wenke from Hubert D. Henry, Feb. 15, 1963. The amendment
was proposed in the Senate Judiciary Committee, but as was stated, note 5 supra, the
bill was never reported out of committee and the amendment never was printed in the
Journal. The amendment would have added the provision for the register in H.B. 69,
44th Colo. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. § 3-16-2(10) of § 1, at 5-6 (1963), substituting it
for the printed subsection '(10).
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for setting aside agency action. Vast inconsistencies also exist in
provisions for the adoption of rules, for the revocation of licenses,
and for the taking of evidence in agency hearings.
The adoption of the revised Administrative Procedure Act
which was first presented to the General Assembly in 1963 would
remedy the major deficiencies of the present APA. By repeal of
conflicting provisions in specific statutes, the revised act would
eliminate areas of conflict and make the APA uniformly applicable
to all state agencies. The revised act's major substantive change
would create a central panel of hearing officers, who could be
delegated to conduct hearings for any agency in accord with pro-
cedural requirements of the APA. Judicial review procedures would
be more exactly defined in the revised version.
In addition to the changes proposed in 1963, a revised APA
should incorporate a provision for a Colorado Regulations Register,
which would publish all rules and notices required by the APA
to be published.
To eliminate the confusion and uncertainty caused by the
present diversity of regulations, the revised Administrative Pro-
cedure Act should be re-presented to the General Assembly at the
earliest possible time, and should be enacted into law.
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